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W. Bradley Wendel* Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror:
The 2008 F.W. Wickwire Memorial Lecture
This article discusses the ethical responsibilities of the lawyers who advise
executive branch officials on the lawfulness of actions taken in the name of national
security. To even talk about this subject assumes that there is some distinction
-between a government that does all within its power to protect its citizens, and
one that does all within its lawful power If there are good normative reasons to
care about maintaining this distinction, then we have the key to understanding the
ethical responsibilities of government lawyers. The Bush administration took the
position that the role of lawyers is to get out of the way in circumstances of a threat
to national security, and not do anything to interfere with the most aggressive
possible government response. The author's argument is not based on the
horrific nature of torture as an ordinary moral matter In fact, one of the arguments
here is that supporters of the administration's policies have made a conceptual
mistake by attempting to establish the moral permissibility of torture in some
cases, those resembling the hypothetical "ticking bomb" scenario. The problem
with this argument is not only that the ticking bomb case is wildly unrealistic, but
that the legality of torture is distinct from the morality of torture, and it is the job of
lawyers to advise on the former, not the latter
L'article traite des responsabilit6s morales des avocats qui dispensent aux cadres
supdrieurs des conseils sur la l6galit6 des mesures prises au nom de la s6curite
nationale. Le seul fait d'aborder le sujet laisse supposer qu'il existe une distinction
entre un gouvernement qui fait tout en son pouvoir pour proteger ses citoyens
et un gouvernement qui fait tout ce qu'il a lgalement le pouvoir de faire. S'il
existe de bons motifs normatifs de se soucier de maintenir cette distinction, nous
tenons alors la cl qui nous aidera J comprendre les responsabilit5s morales
des avocats salaries de I'Etat. Ladministration Bush a adopte la position que le
r6le des avocats est de s'effacer dans des circonstances o) il y a menace I la
sdcurit6 nationale, et non de faire quoi que ce soit pour s'opposer J la reaction la
plus agressive possible du gouvernement. L'auteur ne fonde pas son argument
sur I'horrible nature de la torture comme question morale courante. De fait, un
des arguments invoqu6s est que les partisans des politiques de I'administration
ont commis une erreur conceptuelle en tentant d'affirmer que la torture est
permissible dans certaines situations, soit celles qui ressemblent P I'hypothese
qu'on est en presence d'une bombe ! retardement. Le probleme que pose cet
argument est que non seulement I'hypoth~se de la bombe j retardement est-il
tout a fait irrealiste, mais 6galement que la lMgalit6 de la torture est distincte de la
moralit6 de la torture-et le role des avocats est de dispenser des conseils sur la
premiere, non sur la seconde.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. I am grateful to Richard Devlin and
Dean Phillip Saunders for their kind invitation and all of the excellent support they provided for this
Lecture.
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Introduction
In 2008, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, gave an interview with BBC Radio in which he ridiculed
the moral objections raised by critics of the Bush Administration's torture
program:
Is it really so easy to determine that smacking someone in the face to
determine where he has hidden the bomb that is about to blow up Los
Angeles is prohibited in the constitution? It would be absurd to say you
couldn't do that. And once you acknowledge that, we're into a different
game.
It is tempting to use these remarks as the starting point for a lecture on
judicial ethics. Not that I think it is problematic for judges to speak in
public about contested political matters-in fact, I think the American law
regulating judicial conduct is unnecessarily skittish about judges publicly
stating views that might be deemed "political," The ethical problem with
Justice Scalia's comments are that they rieveal a remarkably superficial
thought process with respect to one of the most serious matters facing
any government today: how to effectively protect national security and
the lives of citizens while not surrendering our commitment to values
such as human dignity and decency. Regrettably, attempts to minimize
the terrible nature of the conduct we are engaging in are all too common.'
Justice Scalia talks about "smacking someone in the face" in order to save
Los Angeles. I wonder whether he would feel differently about conduct
described as follows:
Waterboarding is controlled drowning .... It does not simulate drowning,
as the lungs are actually filling with water. There is no way to simulate
that. The victim is drowning.... A team doctor watches the quantity of
water that is ingested and for the physiological signs which show when the
I. "US judge steps in to torture row" BBC News (12 February 2008), online: BBC News <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7239748.stm>.
2. See e.g. Jess Bravin, Gary Fields, "How do U.S. interrogators make a captured terrorist talk?"
The Wall Street Journal (4 March 2003); Jackie Northam, "Army probes deaths of Iraq, Afghanistan
detainees" All Things Considered: NPR Broadcast (16 March, 2005), online: National Public Radio
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4537927>.
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drowning effect goes from painful psychological experience, to horrific
suffocating punishment to the final death spiral. Waterboarding is slow
motion suffocation with enough time to contemplate the inevitability of
black out and expiration-usually the person goes into hysterics on the
board.... When it is done right it is controlled death.'
This is what we do to people, specifically to detainees in the so-called
"war on terror." In 2008 the White House admitted that waterboarding
had been used in several cases, insisted that it was legal, and intimated that
it could be used in the future.4 Vice President Dick Cheney had already
stated that, in his view, it was a "no brainer" that suspected terrorists
could be waterboarded although, like Justice Scalia, he preferred to refer
to torture euphemistically, calling a terrifying simulated death a "dunk
in the water."5 It is important to focus on these statements by high-level
government officials, because the problem of human rights violations
in the war on terror is not simply a matter of a few rogue interrogators
getting out of control. It would be comforting to believe that the abuses
such as those documented at Abu Ghraib were committed by a couple of
bad apples. 6 The truth, however, is that the United States has adopted an
elaborate torture policy. And when a government adopts policies, lawyers
inevitably are involved. Dick Cheney could believe whatever he wanted
about the morality of torture, but the policy would not be approved and
implemented unless someone concluded that it was consistent with law.
3. This account is from an article by Malcolm Nance, a former instructor at the U.S. Navy's
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) School. The full article can be found in an on-
line magazine called Small Wars Journal, Malcolm Nance, "Waterboarding is torture ... period"
Small Wars Journal (31 October 2007), online: Small Wars Journal <http://smallwarsjoumal.com/
blog/ 2007/10/waterboarding-is-torture-perio/>. See also Richard E. Mezo, "Why it was called 'Water
Torture' The Washington Post (10 February 2008), B7. See generally Evan Wallach, "Drop by Drop:
Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts" (2007) 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 468.
4. See Jennifer Loven, "White House defends interrogation method" Associated Press (6 February
2008), online: Bay Ledger News Zone <http://www.blnz.com/news/2008/O2/06/WhiteHouse_
defendsinterrogation_method_6332.html>. See also Scott Shane, "C.I.A. Chief doubts tactic to
interrogate is still legal" The New York Times (8 February 2008), online: The New York Times <http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/washington/08intel.html>; Philip Shenon, "Mukasey offers view on
waterboarding" The New York Times (30 January 2008), online: The New York Times <http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/01/30/washington/30justice.html>.
5. See Dan Eggen, "Cheney's remarks fuel torture debate" The Washington Post (27 October
2006), online: Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyni/content/article/2006/l0/26/
AR200610260152 l.html>; Mark Tran, "Cheney endorses simulated drowning" The Guardian (27
October 2006), online: Guardian Unlimited <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/27/usa.
guantanamo>.
6. George Bush blamed the abuse at Abu Ghraib on "a few bad apples" and has doggedly persisted
in this explanation, just as he has continued to insist that "we don't torture." See e.g. Mark Danner,
"Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story" The New York Review of Books 51:15 (7 October 2004).
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That's where the lawyers come in. The lawyers have helped design an
elaborate legal torture policy.
The title of this lecture is "Government Lawyers in a Time of Terror,"
and the subject is the ethical responsibilities of the lawyers who advise
executive branch officials on the lawfulness of actions needed to protect
the lives of their citizens. To even talk about this subject assumes that
there is some distinction between a government that does all within its
power to protect its citizens, and one that does all within its lawful power.
Some defenders of the Bush administration have assumed it is self-evident
that the role of lawyers is to get out of the way in these circumstances, and
not do anything to interfere with the most aggressive possible response.
The most extreme version of this position is the assertion of John Yoo, the
former Office of Legal Counsel lawyer who drafted many of the memos
authorizing the torture of detainees. Yoo believes the terrorists are using
the rule of law against the United States, as a weapon, in a novel strategy
of "lawfare." Knowing that our hands will be tied up with legal red tape,
and that government officials will be worried about incurring civil, or even
criminal, liability for acting too energetically, terrorists know they will
not run the same risks of detection and capture as they would if they were
dealing with an enemy unconstrained by such legal niceties. I am not
quite sure what to make of this argument, even though I know its rhetorical
purpose is to put the burden of proof on those who would defend imposing
restrictions on the freedom of the government to act. The reason I find
it baffling is that it is inherent in the nature of law to limit what would
otherwise be the freedom of anyone, whether dn individual or the state, to
act.8 Lawful action is a subset of all action, and presumably we care about
the ascription of lawfulness for a reason. Assuming there is a reason for
all of us, as a society, to care about the distinction between lawful action
and simply action, then it is the special.role of lawyers to ensure that this
distinction is respected.
My aim in this lecture is to briefly suggest what might be the reason to
care about the distinction between legality and the exercise of raw power.
If there are good moral reasons to care about maintaining this distinction,
7. See John Yoo, "Terror suspects are waging 'Lawfare' on U.S." Philadelphia Inquirer (16 January
2008), online: Philadelphia Inquirer < http://www.philly.com/inquirer/>. Conservative commentator
Heather MacDonald has similarly argued that interrogations have been so hemmed in by bureaucratic
and legalistic safeguards that American interrogators erred too far in the direction of respecting the
rights of detainees. See Heather MacDonald, "How to Interrogate Terrorists" City Journal 15:1 (Winter
2005), online: City Journal < http://www.city-joumal.org/html/15_ lterrorists.html>.
8. Scott Horton, "Through a Mirror, Darkly: Applying the Geneva Conventions to 'A New Kind
of Warfare' in Karen J. Greenberg, ed., The Torture Debate in America (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005) 136 at 147.
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then we have the key to understanding the ethical responsibilities of
lawyers. Before getting into that part of the argument, however, I first
want to consider a position that seems initially promising, which is that
ethics for government lawyers is really no different from ethics for people
generally. If doing something, like torturing people, is horrible in ordinary
moral terms, then it is horrible for lawyers to participate in a process that
leads to torture being practised. Many prominent legal ethics scholars
argue that we should understand the responsibilities of lawyers in this way.
Deborah Rhode, for example, argues:
Lawyers can, and should, act on the basis of their own principled
convictions.... [L]awyers [must be prepared to] accept personal
responsibility for the moral consequences of their professional actions.
Attorneys should make decisions as advocates in the same way that
morally reflective individuals make any ethical decision.9
Applying Rhode's approach, any morally reflective individual would
recognize that the prohibition on torture is as close to a moral absolute as
there is. Thus, morally reflective lawyers-who, after all, continue to be
persons and moral agents, even when acting in a professional capacity-
should refuse to lend their assistance to designing an official torture
regime.
I disagree that this is the right way to think about legal ethics, because
there are important differences between the morality of ordinary life
and what the late philosopher Bernard Williams said are the values and
principles "inherent in there being. such a thing as politics."'" This is not
because morality is relative or subjective or just a matter of opinion but
because political, and especially legal, considerations have properties
such as generality, creating precedent for future cases, and being applied
by institutions and procedures and thus being susceptible to a kind of
bureaucratic rationality. This is both a virtue of legality, the foundation
of the classical ideal of the rule of law, and a .danger when lawyers try to
make moral decisions in the same way as an ordinarily morally sensible
person, without being sensitive to the particular institutional context of
these decisions. To elaborate on this claim, I want to proceed with an
example that often comes up in discussions about ethics and torture.
9. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: reforming the legal profession (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000) at 58, 66-67.
10. Bernard Williams, "Realism and Moralism in Political Theoiy" in Geoffrey Hawthorn, ed., In
the Beginning Was the Deed (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) 1 at 5.
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I. The morality of torture, for individuals and for states
Observers of debate on the internet have discovered a fixed and invariant
law of nature, known as Godwin's Law. It states: "As an online discussion
grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler
approaches one." I would like to propose a similar principle pertaining to
debates about the morality of torture: that principle is that in any discussion
involving two or more people, it is impossible to mention torture without
someone raising the ticking bomb hypothetical. I am not sure what
accounts for the persistence of this little story. Certainly nothing like it
has ever occurred. It is tempting to blame it on the television series "24,"
which is known to be popular among right-wing politicians and judges
in the U.S." But the ticking bomb story predates "24"-the philosopher
Henry Shue, in his classic 1978 article on torture, wrote about the ticking
bomb hypothetical, and his wearied tone suggests that he had been talking
about it for years.'
2
The ticking bomb story goes like this.' 3  Law enforcement officers
have captured a known member of a terrorist cell, which has hidden a
nuclear bomb somewhere in New York City. The bomb is set to go off in
an hour. Before then it can be found and defused; if the police are too late
... boom. As Shue points out, the hypothetical trades on a completely
unrealistic assumption of certainty with respect to the critical facts:
I1. See Jane Mayer, "Whatever It Takes; Letter from Hollywood" The New Yorker 83:1 (19 February
2007) 66.
12. See Henry Shue, "Torture" (1978) 7 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 124 at 141.
13. See e.g. Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Jlorks: Understanding the Threat, Responding to
the Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) at 140-142; Richard A. Posner, "Torture,
Terrorism, and Interrogation" in Sanford Levinson, ed., Torture: A Collection (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004) 291; Charles Krauthammer, "The Truth about Torture" The Weekly Standard
11:12 (5 December 2005), online: Weeklystandard.com <http://www.weeklystandard.com/ Content/
Public/ArticlesOOO/000/006/400rhqav.asp?pg=2>: James R. Schlesinger, Final Report of the
Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein, 2005).
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The proposed victim of our torture is not someone we suspect of planting
the device: he is the perpetrator. He is not some pitiful psychotic making
one last play for attention: he did plant the device. The wiring is not
backwards, the mechanism is not jammed: the device will destroy the
city if not deactivated.... 14
Once you make these assumptions, however, the rhetorical strategy
of the hypothetical is clear.'5 You are forced to admit that, yes, in those
circumstances torture would be justified. Why? Because while it may
represent a prima facie violation of someone's human rights, that violation
is necessary to avoid a catastrophic consequence. The justification takes
the form of consequentialist balancing, or at least an exercise in threshold
deontology-given a sufficiently large number of potential victims, it
would be permissible to torture someone in order to prevent the harm.
Even Shue admits, "I can see no way to deny the permissibility of torture
in a casejust like this."'6 The idea is, therefore, to force the admission that
there is a moral debate to be had about torture.'7
I don't see the point in conducting "debates" around fanciful scenarios
that bear no relationship with the actual problem we are supposed to be
debating. In addition to Shue's point about the implicit epistemology of
the example, there are several other, fairly well known, reasons why it
should not be taken seriously.
1. The description of the problem omits to mention the possibility
of what the military euphemistically calls "collateral damage"-innocent
bystanders who are in the wrong place at the wrong time, and suffer the
harm intended for someone else. Some 5,000 people have been detained,
and some number of those mistreated, since the September 11 th attacks.' 8
How many have possessed information that could be used to prevent
future attacks? But even this 'response misses the real objection, which is
14. Shue, supra note 12 at 142. Those who employ the ticking-bomb argument are understandably
keen to find real-world analogues. One frequently cited case involves the torture by secret police in
the Philippines of a suspected member of an al-Qaeda cell that led to the unwinding of a plot to blow
up several Western airliners over the Pacific. See Richard A. Posner, "The Best Offense" The New
Republic 227:10 (2 September 2002) 28 at 28; Doug Struck et al., "Borderless network of terror" The
Washington Post (23 September 2001) Al. The problem with relying on this case, however, is that at
the time the interrogation of the captured suspect began, Philippine intelligence officials did not know
of the plot, or that the captive had information that could prevent it. They simply tortured him because
he was believed to be part of al-Qaeda, and fortuitously they discovered information that enabled
them to unwind the bombing plot. See David Luban, "Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb" in
Greenberg, supra note 8, 35 at 45.
15. See Luban, ibid. at 44.
16. Shue, supra note 12at 141.
17. See Elaine Scarry, "Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz" in Levinson, supra note
13,281 at 285.
18. Ibid. at 284.
253
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that talking in the sterile, abstract terms of numbers of potential victims
tends to discount the human costs of employing torture. Consider the
case of Dilawar, the Afghani taxi driver who was tortured to death by
American personnel at Bagram Air Force base, because they believed he
had information about rocket attacks on American soldiers.' 9 As it turns
out, not only was Dilawar completely innocent-he had been set up by the
real perpetrator of the attacks, who had turned in innocent people in order
to lull the Americans into trusting him-but many of his captors had come
to believe in his innocence before he died. Nevertheless, the imperatives
of the intelligence-gathering process had acquired their own momentum,
and it was impossible to shut down the brutality in time.
2. The second problem is that the ticking bomb scenario contains no
logical stopping point. If torturing the prisoner is justified by the necessity
of saving thousands of lives, is it permissible to threaten to kill or torture
the seven year-old son of the terrorist?20 Or, can we torture a bystander
who happens to have information about the location of the bomb, but is
reluctant to talk for fear of retaliation? The appeal to necessity creates an
open-ended invitation to balance away the costs on one side of the ledger.2 '
With catastrophe on the other side, it is natural not to think very hard about
the harm we are prepared to inflict. Threatening to, and actually torturing
the seven year-old son of the suspect is no more difficult to justify on this
kind of analysis than torturing the suspect himself. Yet, once we accept
that equivalence, we have clearly lost sight of something with great moral
significance.
Going in the other direction, the analysis does not provide much
guidance as to what constitutes a sufficiently catastrophic outcome that
justifies putting aside moral restraints. A bomb blowing up New York
City is one thing, but What about a bomb blowing up a thousand people,
or a hundred, or ten, or two? Sandy Levinson has argued that, while we
are always being told by politicians that 9/11 changed everything, it did
19. See Tim Golden, "In US report, brutal details of 2 Afghan inmates' Deaths" The New York Times
(20 May 2005), online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/ international/
asia/20abuse.html>. See Richard Leiby, "Down a dark road" The Washington Post (27 April 2007),
online: The Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2007/04/26/
AR2007042601569.html>.
20. See Sanford Levinson, "Contemplating Torture: An Introduction" in Levinson, supra note 13, 23
at 32.
21. It may be possible to reformulate the necessity defense to avoid a simple balancing of evils.
Michael Moore has argued that the right form of analysis is threshold deontology, in which we are
not balancing harms, but recognizing a very limited exception to an otherwise absolute prohibition.
See Michael Moore, "Torture and the Balance of Evils" (1989) 23 lsr. L.R. 280 at 287-88. Once the
threshold is passed, however, the objection remains that there appear to be no limits on what harms can
be inflicted to prevent the catastrophe.
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not truly represent an existential threat to our nation. As terrible as it was,
it only serves to remind us that we remain "vulnerable to certain kinds of
terrorism, as had been amply illustrated.., less than a decade earlier when
the World Trade Center was bombed, or with the demolition of American
embassies in Africa. '22 His point is not in any way to minimize the horror
of the 9/11 attacks, but only to remind us that all this talk of ticking bombs
is predicated on something less than the destruction of an entire society,
or an entire city, so we have to take seriously the question of how bad the
consequences have to be on one side of the ledger to justify overriding the
deontological reasons on the other.
3. Finally, even if we are forced to admit, as Henry Shue puts it, that
there is "no way to deny the permissibility of torture in a casejust like this,"
we might nevertheless insist on maintaining moral and legal prohibitions
on torture, to ensure that the torturers are willing to stake everything on this
being a true ticking-bomb situation. While we might be able to envision
a court concluding, after the fact, that law enforcement personnel acted
reasonably in light of the emergency, it is essential that this possibility
of after-the-fact justification not be allowed to influence the underlying
substantive rules of conduct, .which establish an absolute prohibition
on torture, nor to influence the deliberation of persons subject to these
conduct rules.2 3 We create a kind of artificial separation between conduct
rules and decision rules, applied by courts after the fact, in order to force
actors to consider whether they believe torture is really necessary, even if
it means being prosecuted for war crimes. "[T]he test of necessity should
be the actor's willingness to face, as an alternative to the ill consequences
of abiding by the law, the threat of criminal punishment unmitigated by the
prospect of legal reprieve. '24 Watering down the prohibition on torture, to
accommodate the possibility of ticking-bomb cases, can lead to disastrous
consequences in the long run, while not making it any more likely that the
interrogator will do the right thing in the ticking bomb case.
The reference to long-term consequences leads to the point that I want
to emphasize in connection with analysis of the ticking-bomb hypothetical
from the point of view of legal ethics.
22. Levinson, supra note 20.
23. See Meir Dan-Cohen, "Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law" (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625.
24. Ibid. at 683; see also Scarry, supra note 17 at 282.
255
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Although this may sound trivial, there is a world of difference
between asking whether such-and-such is immoral and asking whether
it is unethical to advise a client that such-and-such is legally permitted.
Legal considerations, by their nature, can be generalized to apply to
similar cases. It is also in the nature of legal reasoning that it takes into
account the capacities of various institutional actors-for example, courts
give varying levels of deference to the legal and factual decisions made
by juries, trial judges, administrative agencies, and so on. Legal processes
are adapted to dealing with imperfect information, and never proceed from
the assumed truth of some fact (like whether this person in custody planted
the bomb). Thus, we should be wary of attempts to simply transplant
the moral evaluation of some problem, like torture, into the legal domain.
Even assliming you have some sympathies for the police officers in the
ticking-bomb scenario, there are reasons to resist moving too quickly to
the conclusion that torture should be legal in these circumstances.
Picking up on Hannah Arendt's account of the trial ofAdolf Eichmann,
this might be called the "banality of evil" argument.25 The problem is
that specifying conditions for the legal permissibility of torture tends to
normalize it. 26 Legal permissibility implies ajustification that can be given
on the basis of reasons that can be generalized to relevantly similar cases;
anything else would be ad hoc and lawless. Legalizing something means
there will be policies and guidelines put into place, chains of command and
review procedures to regulate compliance with these guidelines, and a new
structure of rationality employed that may be described as bureaucratic.27
The result will be an erosion of the moral sensibilities of everyone-those
who administer the system, the line-level law enforcement and military
personnel who actually do the torturing, and members of society who
observe the abuses committed in their name.28
Fortunately, one would hope, the possibility of an actual legalized
torture regime exists only in the fantasies of John Yoo, Dick Cheney and,
25. See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil (New York:
Viking Press, 1964). See Susan Neiman, Evil in modern thought: an alternative history ofphilosophy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 301. ("Contemporary dangers begin with trivial and
insidious steps. Once these are taken, they lead to consequences so yast they could hardly have been
foreseen.")
26. Shue, supra note 12 at 141. ("[A] considerable danger exists that whatever necessary conditions
were specified, any practice of torture once set in motion would gain enough momentum to burst any
bonds and become a standard operating procedure.")
27. Luban, supra note 14 at 47. ("The real world is a world of policies, guidelines, and directives. It
is a world of practices, not of ad hoc emergency measures.")
28. See Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Torture: Cancer of Democracy- France and Algeria 1954-1962,
trans. by Barry Richard (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1963). See generally Jonathan Glover,
Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999).
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somewhat surprisingly, Alan Dershowitz, who has proposed establishing
procedures for obtaining "torture warrants" in ticking-bomb scenarios.29
The law as it stands contemplates no latitude whatsoever for employing
interrogation techniques that are tantamount to torture. But this hope
is contradicted by the evident fact that a number of very smart lawyers
in the elite Office of Legal Counsel have concluded that some of these
"enhanced" interrogation techniques are permissible. How did that occur,
and what do we think of the ethics of these lawyers? The answer to this
question will take up the remainder of the lecture and, as I have been
suggesting, will not be given primarily in terms of the ordinary immorality
of torture. Instead, I want to argue that the role of lawyer contains certain
internal ethical standards, including standards of good lawyering craft.
The problem with the advice given to the Bush administration about the
legality of torture is not that it is unethical because torture is immoral;
rather, it is unethical because it is crummy legal advice.
II. Government lawyers and the ethical responsibility offidelity to law
It is often asserted that the basic obligation of government lawyers is
to provide impartial legal advice and to remain independent of partisan
political concerns. George Washington is reported to have said he was
seeking a "neutral expounder of the law rather than a political advisor"
when he selected the nation's first Attorney General.30 Although the
distinction between independence and partisanship, is a superficially
appealing one, it does not stand up very well to analysis. The reason for
this is that the President is elected on the basis of an ideological agenda he
puts forward. The winner of the presidential election justifiably believes
that the election conferred a mandate from voters to pursue a particular
political agenda. The President accordingly may select executive branch
officials on basis of their fealty to this agenda-not just because it is the
President's agenda, but because the content of the agenda has been set by
a democratically legitimate process. The responsibility of these officials
is, in part, to serve as agents of the President, faithfully executing the
President's agenda. Lawyers are agents, too, and they accordingly have a
responsibility to help the President implement his agenda, as long as it is
lawful to do so. When I say lawyers are agents, that does not mean that
their responsibility is simply to help their client do whatever it wants, as
long as there is some argument that can be made, however far-fetched,
that the conduct is legally permissible. Rather, the role of the lawyer is
29. See Dershowitz, supra note 13.
30. See Griffin B. Bell, "Office of the Attorney General's Client Relationship" (1981) 36 Bus. Law.
791.
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to ascertain what the client's legal rights and duties really are. That task
is different in an important way from trying to figure out what the client
can get away with. It's possible to get away with a lot of things, by
concealment, secrecy, subterfuge, or the exercise of raw coercive power,
but that does not mean it is legal.
Concluding that something is legal necessarily means accepting the
law from what the legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart called "the internal point
of view," as creating genuine obligations, not simply enabling citizens
to predict when government officials will do unpleasant things like lock
them in jail or seize their property.' This little bit of jurisprudential
terminology is useful, because it helps distinguish a very different way
from looking at the law, which might be called the Holmesian bad man
stance. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously told a class of entering law
students that if they wanted to know what they law required, they should
look at it from the point of view of a bad man, who was uninterested in
doing the right thing, but only keen to avoid punishment.32 Holmes's
point was really to stress the autonomy of the law and the separability
of the legal and moral domains. It may be that there are legal duties that
do not track moral duties exactly, and students who fail to appreciate this
might misunderstand the content of the law. One might have a moral
obligation to save the life of a stranger in peril, but tort law does not
impose a legal duty to rescue. Holmes's point, however, has come to
be understood as an invitation to conceive of the binding force of law as
deriving entirely from the possibility that sanctions might be imposed on
conduct. If sanctions are not imposed, one is thus entitled to infer that
the conduct was lawful. Hart understood that the problem with reading
Holmes in this way is that it eliminates legality as a conceptual category
altogether. If one is interested in distinguishing between something that is
permitted as a matter of right, and something that one got away with, it is
necessary to build into one's theory the possibility of recognizing the law
as creating genuine obligations.
One might respond that all that matters is freedom of action, and
whether it is possible to get away with something. Hart himself was really
only concerned with ensuring that judges acknowledged legal obligations
3 1. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 89. See W. Bradley
Wendel, "Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View" (2006) 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1473.
32. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., "The Path of the Law" (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 at 459-462.
See also Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, "The Redemption of Professionalism?" in Robert
L. Nelson, David M. Trubek, & Rayman L. Solomon, eds., Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices:
Transformations in the American Legal Profession (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 230 at
249.
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from the internal point of view. I believe, however, that most clients are
interested in knowing when something is legally permissible, and that
lawyers, when they say, "You are legally permitted to do such-and-such,"
are asserting that the client has a right to do such-and-such, not just that
it is unlikely that the client will be detected and punished. Despite some
aggresgive talk by Bush administration officials about taking a "forward-
leaning" approach to legal compliance,33 the government was interested
in asserting that its interrogation policy was really lawful, in the sense
that government lawyers had concluded that the law permitted the conduct
in question.34 The government in fact was not seeking only freedom of
action, but action with the blessing of the law. Expressing this sort of
justification for one's action necessarily means acknowledging the law
from the internal point of view.
I would go so far as to say that it is an ethical failing to refuse to orient
oneself to the law in this way. Yes, there are unjust laws, and one might take
an attitude of resistance, or at least grudging acquiescence, toward them.
But the mere fact that some legal rule or doctrine seems wrong by one's
moral lights does not mean there is a correlative right to disobey the law.
We have avenues for challenging unjust laws, through lawsuits against the
government, lobbying for reform, protests, and even civil disobedience,
which is the morally motivated, open defiance of the law coupled with the
willingness to accept lawful penalties. What unifies all of these responses
is the overt nature of resistance to the specific law in question, combined
with an attitude of respect for the legal system as a whole. In the American
legal tradition, we tend to valorize opposition to unjust laws. Our heroes
are the African-American students who sat in at lunch counters to protest
legal segregation, and Rosa Parks, who refused to move to the back of the
bus, as commanded by law. We are right to see civil rights protesters as
heroes, but it is important to recognize that their resistance to specific laws
33. See Tim Golden, "After terror, a secret rewriting of military law" The New York Times (24
October 2004), online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/24/ international/
worldspecial2/24gitmo.html>; R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen, "Gonzalez helped set the course
for detainees" The Washington Post (5 January 2005), online: The Washington Post <http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48446-2005Jan4.html>; Jane Mayer, "Outsourcing Torture"
The New Yorker 81:1 (14 February 2005) 106, online: The New Yorker <http://www.newyorker.con
archive/2005/02/l4/050214fafact6> (reporting testimony by head of counter-terrorism operations for
the CIA, who told Congressional committees that "there was a 'before 9/1l' and there was an 'after
9/1I.' After 9/11, the gloves came off.").
34. Mike Allen & Dana Priest, "Memo on torture draws focus to Bush" The Washington Post (9
June 2004), online: The Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26401 -
2004Jun8.html> (quoting former administration official saying that the CIA "was prepared to get more
aggressive and re-learn old skills, but only with explicit assurances from the top that they were doing
so with the full legal authority the president could confer on them").
HeinOnline -- 31 Dalhousie L.J. 259 2008
260 The Dalhousie Law Journal
was founded on the conviction that our legal system was basically just,
but could be better. Their disobedience was an appeal to higher values
that were latent within the society and its legal system. Martin Luther
King's famous defense of civil disobedience advocates breaking unjust
laws openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty. 5 The
openness of non-compliance, and the willingness to accept the penalty are
a way of manifesting respect for one's fellow citizens.
King's directive to disobey lovingly may sound odd, particularly
abstracted from the religious context from which it grows, but it is important
to focus on the attitude conveyed toward one's fellow citizens by obedience
or disobedience to the law. The claim that, "I believe this law is unjust,
in moral terms," is a claim that other citizens and the procedures they
have set up for making and administering the law, are somehow morally
corrupt. As Jeremy Waldron has said, this represents a combination of
self-assurance, in the rightness of my own convictions, and mistrust in the
convictions of my fellow citizens.36 That mistrust may be warranted, as in
the Jim Crow era in the American South, when whites can hardly be said
to have been acknowledging African-Americans as full and equal citizens.
But it seems out of place in today's debate about the balance between
national security and civil liberties, in which the disagreement is vigorous,
but the dispute is in good faith, and no position has been systematically
excluded. In these circumstances, morally motivated disobedience of the
law does exhibit the attitude of disrespect Waldron describes, of believing
oneself to have privileged access to moral truth.
At root this is what is wrong with the defense of the Bush
administration's policies which rests on the so-called "new paradigm"
of 9/11. For example, John Yoo has said that we need to re-think the
law of war to deal with the new threat of stateless terrorism. In a talk at
William and Mary Law School, Yoo said that the Geneva Conventions
make sense in a war between nation-states, but we ought to establish a
new set of rules when dealing with al-Qaeda.37 One problem with Yoo's
argument is that the threat of non-state terrorism is not exactly new. The
international community has had plenty of time to develop legal norms
respecting the treatment of detainees in non-state conflicts, including not
only insurgents and parties to civil wars, but also international terrorists.
35. Martin Luther King, "Letter from Birmingham City Jail" in Hugo Adam Bedau, ed., Civil
Disobedience in Focus (New York: Routledge, 1991) 68.
36. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) at 281-282.
37. See Brian Whitson, "John Yoo defends views on treatment of terrorists" W&M News (8 April
2005) online: College of William & Mary <http://web.wm.edu/news/archive/index. php?id=4427>.
This is also a theme of Yoo's "lawfare" op-ed. See Yoo, supra note 7.
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Prior to September 11, 2001, international and domestic law had developed
with full cognizance of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, campaigns of
terrorism by non-state actors like the IRA and ETA, and even previous
al-Qaeda-linked attacks against the United States. That existing law, as I
will discuss momentarily, cannot possibly be understood by a good faith
interpreter as permitting waterboarding and other "enhanced interrogation
techniques" on detainees in American custody.
Just when one makes a legal argument against John Yoo, however, he
pivots and offers a moral argument, which is why I have been spending so
much time talking about morally motivated disobedience. At his William
and Mary talk, Yoo said that we ought to establish a new set of rules
for dealing with al-Qaeda. That may or may not be true, but basing a
determination of legality on what a lawyer thinks the law ought to be pretty
clearly substitutes the lawyer's judgment-no doubt reinforced by the
client's wishes-for the result of a process designed to resolve these sorts
of moral and political disagreements through tolerably fair procedures. It
is the assertion that John Yoo, and other national security hard-liners in
the Bush administration, know more about the morality of torture than the
rest of us.
As I have been emphasizing, however, the objection to the advice given
by lawyers for the Bush administration is not that it is bad moral advice;
rather, it is that it is bad legal advice. The law simply does not permit
what interrogators at Gitmo, Bagram Air Base, and nameless "black sites"
in eastern Europe have done to detainees. The natural response to this
line of objection is often an assertion of the indeterminacy of law. I could
quote academic lawyers, but this statement from President Bush is a pretty
good summary of the indeterminacy claim. After the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that American personnel overseas had to comply with Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit outrages upon human
dignity, Bush noted, "[t]hat's like-it's very vague. What does that mean
'outrages upon human dignity'? That's a statement that is wide open
to interpretation."38 Similarly, Attorney General Michael Mukasey has
equivocated on the question of whether waterboarding is illegal. In a letter
he released in advance of a hearing on interrogation policy, he stated:
If this were an easy question, I would not be reluctant to offer my views
on this subject. But, with respect, I believe it is not an easy question.
There are some circumstances where current law would appear clearly
38. U.S., Office of the President of the U.S. George W. Bush, "The President's News Conference"
(15 September 2006), online: The American Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=861 >.
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to prohibit the use of waterboarding. Other circumstances would present
a far closer question.39
This sort of reasoning is intuitively appealing to lawyers, who recognize
that there are legal questions about which reasonable minds can differ. But
lawyers also recognize that there are some legal questions about which
there are no differences of opinion or, at least, about which the range of
differences is narrower.
The law governing torture is one of those areas in which there really is
not any disagreement, in good faith, about the meaning and application of
core terms. With respect to international law, the Third Geneva Convention,
applicable to prisoners of war, prohibits the inflicting of physical or mental
torture, or any form of coercion, on prisoners of war.40 The Fourth Geneva
Convention, applicable to civilian detainees, requires the protection of
civilians from all acts of violence or threats thereof.4' Common Article
3, which is part of all of the separate Geneva Conventions, outlaws
cruel treatment and torture, as well as outrages upon personal dignity,
and humiliating and degrading treatment.42 The Convention Against
Torture prohibits not only torture, but also cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment which does not amount to torture.43 Moreover, the prohibition
on torture is a jus cogens norm in international law-a peremptory
standard that may not be derogated from under any circumstances.' There
are similar prohibitions in U.S. domestic law. These include a general
federal assault statute, prohibiting assaults by striking or beating within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 45 and
a federal criminal statute specifically addressing torture, which prohibits
anyone outside the United States to commit torture, which is defined as
an act specifically intended to inflict severe mental or physical pain or
46suffering.
39. Quoted in Scott Horton, "Reasonable Minds Can Differ" Harper Magazine (31 January 2008),
online: Harper's Magazine < http://www.harpers.org/archive/2008/01/hbc-90002285>; original letter
available online: <http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2008/images/01/29/letter.to.senator.leahy.pdf>.
40. Geneva Convention [III] relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135,6 U.S.T. 3517.
41. Geneva Convention [IV] relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 7me of War, 12 August
1949,75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
42. Common Article III is the same in all the relevant Conventions. Supra note 40, note 41.
43. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027.
44. See generally Sean D. Murphy, ed., "Executive Branch Memoranda on Status and Permissible
Treatment of Detainees" (2004) 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 820; Derek Jinks & David Sloss, "Is the President
Bound by the Geneva Conventions?" (2004) 90 Cornell L. Rev. 97, at 108-20.
45. Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. 113.
46. Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A.
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As you might expect, the administration's lawyers have an explanation
for why these prohibitions do not apply to prohibit the treatment inflicted
upon detainees. They argue that the POW convention does not apply
because al-Qaeda was not a contracting party to the Geneva Conventions,
ignoring past American practice of treating all armed combatants, not just
soldiers of signatory states, as POW's under the Third Geneva Convention.47
With respect to the Fourth Geneva Convention on civilian detainees, the
lawyers argue that the President has deemed al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters
"unlawful combatants. ' '48 The trouble with that argument is that it may
be possible for a detainee to lose POW status by being a non-privileged
or unlawful combatant, but that simply throws that detainee into civilian
status, protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention. One is either a POW
or a civilian detainee; it is not possible to be a kind of legal non-person,
totally outside the coverage of the Geneva scheme. As the International
Committee of the Red Cross has stated, "nobody in enemy hands can fall
outside the law."'49 Regarding Common Article 3, which applies to all
detainees, however they may otherwise be categorized, the administration
lawyers reasoned that the conflict with al-Qaeda is"international in
scope."50 Common Article 3 applies to conflicts "not of an international
character" and the Global War on Terrorism is, obviously enough, global.
But this reasoning is simply wrong as well, because the point of Common
Article 3 is to fill in the gaps in coverage created by the application of
the rest of the Geneva Conventions to conflicts between nation-states. A
conflict is one or the other-a war between nation-states, or a conflict not
of an international character-there is no such thing as an inherently non-
law-governed conflict.
We could obviously explore each of these arguments in much more
detail; the analysis of any of these legal provisions could occupy a lecture
of its own. The point of raising them is to show that, at some point, a
legal argument becomes untenable. A lawyer who knew enough about
47. See Presidential Memorandum of February 7, 2002, reprinted in Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua
L. Dratel, eds., The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005) 134.
48. U.S., Office of the President of the U.S. George W. Bush, "Executive Order 13440- Interpretation
of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention and Interrogation
Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency" (20 July 2007), online: The American Presidency
Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75569>.
49. ICRC, Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the
Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq
During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (February 2004), online: Global Security <http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/icrc report iraq_feb2004.htm>.
50. Supra note 47. See also Derek Jinks, "September 11 and the Laws of War" (2003) 28 Yale J. Int'l
L. I.
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international humanitarian law and the law of warfare would respond to
the administration lawyers' arguments with incredulity. The incredulity
is a product of participating in an activity, a craft, which carries with it
certain internal standards of good practice-excellences, or virtues, if you
like."' Recognizing what it means to be a practice aimed at some end
means also recognizing what it is to do well or poorly at realizing that
end. This is a long tradition in ethics, going all the way back to Aristotle,
but it has a contemporary application to complex, institutional activities
such as serving as an advisor to clients within the legal system. It means
that we can understand the ethics of participating in that practice as a
matter of craft. In the case of legal ethics, being a good lawyer means
exhibiting fidelity to law, not distorting its meaning to enable the client to
do something unlawful.
I know this may sound mysterious, like I am appealing to some faculty
of intuitive judgment. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once
said it is impossible to define hard-core pornography, but you know it
when you see it.5" However, I am not relying on knowing it when we see
it. An experienced lawyer may have a gut-level negative reaction to an
argument, but that intuition is only a symptom of something that has gone
awry in the argument. How do we know what has gone awry? Making
that determination is part of the craft that we teach in law school. As I
have been arguing, the whole point of the law is to differentiate between
something that you can get away with, and something that is authorized, as
a matter of right, and regulated by rules of general application. We enforce
that distinction by rhetorical practices that take certain considerations into
account, as part of the justification of legal judgments, and exclude other
considerations as irrelevant. Certain argumentative "moves" are ruled out
by the existing body of law. For example, in international law, it is well
understood that the structure of the law of war is intended to create gapless
coverage-there is no such thing as a person who is not either a POW or a
civilian detainee, or a war that is not either "of an international character" or
"not of an interriational character." Many of the categories of non-persons
and non-wars were invented by Bush administration lawyers out of whole
cloth. Another aspect of lawyering craft is analogical reasoning, and the
use of paradigm cases. Marty Lederman gives a nice illustration, using the
standard example from the jurisprudence literature, of a statute prohibiting
51. See David Luban, "Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller" in Legal Ethics and
Human Dignity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 99 at 107-08.
52. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 at 197 (1964).
HeinOnline -- 31 Dalhousie L.J. 264 2008
Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror
"vehicles" in the park. 3 While there may be some indeterminacy in the
application of that statute to, say, a baby stroller, an army jeep on a war
memorial, or an ambulance rushing to the aid of a heart attack victim in
the park, we do know that if the statute means anything, it means that you
cannot drive a souped-up sports car through the park. Waterboarding, says
Lederman, is the souped-up sports car of the prohibitions on torture. If
your legal conclusion is that causing someone to experience the physical
sensation of imminent death is not torture, then something in your argument
has gone off the rails. It is time to abandon whatever interpretive principles
led you to that conclusion, which cannot possibly be the right one, in light
of the obvious purpose and overall rationality underlying the prohibition
on torture.
Conclusion
I do not claim to have a touchstone that can be used to determine whether
a legal argument is plausible or bogus. There can be no such touchstone,
because the criteria for a good or bad legal argument are internal to the craft
of making and evaluating those arguments. If we want to know whether
the lawyers who authorized our current torture regime have got the law
right, there is no substitute for digging into the law. Fortunately, that is
something we, as lawyers, are well equipped to do. Our competence, as
professionals, is bound up with making and evaluating legal arguments.
We know that there are some arguments that are rock-solid, some that
are plausible, some that are dodgy, and some that are impossible to
make with a straight face. All I am saying here is that the ethics of our
profession are constituted, in part, by the requirement that lawyers treat
the law with respect. What that means may vary by context, and we
may permit lawyers representing clients in adversarial litigation to be a
bit more creative with their arguments, relying on the adversary system
to counteract any excessively partisan interpretations. However, when
lawyers are counselling clients on what the law permits, as opposed to
urging a tribunal to adopt a novel interpretation of the law, there is less
room for creativity. In this case, the arguments relied upon by the Bush
administration lawyers are so far outside the range of reasonable that it is
impossible to take them seriously. That is the basis for concluding that
these lawyers acted unethically.
53. See Marty Lederman, "Sony, Ben, But Judge Mukasey Can (and Should) Answer the Question"
Balkinization (29 October 2007), online: Balkinization <http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/10/sorry-
ben-but-judge-mukasey-should.html>. See H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals" (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 at 607; Lon L. Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply
to Professor Hart" (1958) 71 Harv. L. R. 630 at 663.
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